Facts
Dylan Stubbs was charged in late 2021 with multiple child sexual abuse offenses based on alleged incidents from 2017 to 2019. In January 2022, after a detention hearing, the district court ordered Stubbs to remain in custody without bail. Stubbs didn’t appeal that initial decision.
By August 2024—after more than two years in custody—Stubbs filed a motion to modify the detention order. He argued that the prolonged delay before trial constituted a “material change in circumstances” under Utah law. He also claimed that he posed no flight risk or danger to the community, citing his clean record during incarceration, compliance with juvenile court requirements, and positive developments in a related DCFS matter involving his family.
Despite acknowledging the long delay and expressing concerns over Stubbs’s continued incarceration, the district court denied the motion. It concluded that Stubbs had not overcome the State’s argument that he remained a danger to the community and kept the no-bail status in place.
Issue
Did the district court err in denying Stubbs’s motion to modify his pretrial detention without making a specific finding that he was a “substantial danger” to others and without considering alternative conditions for his release?
Rule
Under Utah Code § 77-20-207(1), a court may modify a pretrial detention order only if there is a material change in circumstances. If such a change is found, the court must then assess whether the defendant qualifies for release under § 77-20-201(1)(c)—which requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is either:
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A substantial danger to others or the community, or
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Likely to flee the jurisdiction.
Before denying bail on dangerousness grounds, the court must also consider any available conditions of release that might reasonably mitigate those concerns.
Application
The Utah Court of Appeals first rejected the State’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case. It held that Utah law allows defendants to appeal both original and subsequent pretrial detention orders. The Court also found that the appeal was not moot, despite a slightly revised ruling issued by the district court during the appeal process.
Substantively, the Court determined that the district court did find a material change in circumstances, as the judge expressly acknowledged that the prolonged detention warranted revisiting the bail decision. However, the appellate court found that the trial court’s ruling fell short in two key respects:
- No explicit finding of “substantial danger” – The judge said Stubbs was a “danger,” but the law requires a finding of “substantial danger.” The opinion emphasized that this heightened standard must mean something and cannot be glossed over.
- No consideration of release conditions – The trial court did not evaluate whether any available release conditions could address public safety concerns. This was a statutory requirement that the court failed to address.
Stubbs had presented multiple proffers suggesting that he no longer posed a substantial danger: a clean jail record, compliance with all court-imposed requirements, and evidence that his children were safely reunified with his wife. The appellate court noted that the trial court didn’t fully engage with this evidence and didn’t explain why these changed circumstances still left Stubbs too dangerous for pretrial release.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of Stubbs’s motion to modify pretrial detention. It remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to do what the statute requires: explicitly determine whether Stubbs is a substantial danger and, if so, assess whether any conditions of release could mitigate that risk.
This case reinforces the legal and constitutional importance of pretrial release and clarifies the procedural steps courts must take before continuing prolonged detention without bail. For defense attorneys, it underscores the value of building a strong record of post-charge conduct to support bail modification. For judges, it’s a reminder that careful attention to statutory language—and the defendant’s evolving circumstances—isn’t optional.