Relevant Issue
When should a court consider secondary tools of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history and relevant policy considerations?
Facts
Dr. Belnap sued Dr. Howard relating to defamatory comments that Dr. Howard allegedly made against him during a peer review meeting. Dr. Howard filed a statement of discovery issues, asking the district court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) and Utah Code section 26-25-3 to prohibit the discovery of documents creating during the peer review process. The district court granted Dr. Howard’s request, and Dr. Belnap appealed that decision, claiming that there is an exception to the peer review privilege for statements made in bad faith.
Rule
Only when the court finds ambiguity in a statute’s plain language, should the court look to legislative history and policy considerations in interpreting the statute.
Analysis
When interpreting statutes, Courts seek to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. State v. Rasabout, UT 72 2015. A Court begins by looking to the plain language of the statute based on the statute as a whole. The relevant statute, URCP 26(b)(1), does not mention a bad faith exception, rather it prohibits discovery of privileged matters “in any proceeding of any kind…provided at any stage of a peer review process.” Under the plain language of the text of this rule there is no bad faith exception to this privilege and the statute’s meaning is unambiguous. The Court thus needs not consider legislative history or policy considerations.
Dr. Belnap argued on appeal that a legislative note enacted with rule 26(b)(1) incorporated a bad faith exception to the peer review privilege. The note in question referenced several older provisions in Utah Code where Doctors were required to act in good faith to receive immunity during the peer review process. The Court distinguished those cases, however, where a bad faith exception existed for immunity during peer review from the present issue of a bad faith exception to discovery of peer review materials.
Holding
Because the language of rule 26(b)(1) was unambiguous to the Court, the Court does not consider any legislative history in their interpretation of the statute. Even if the Court were to consider the note in question it would not change the result, that the peer review materials that Dr. Belnap sought to discovery were privileged.