This appeal involved multiple issues, including the claim that the trial court improperly denied a motion for directed verdict. The Court discussed the proper standard of review for this issue.
Facts
Diviney was charged with multiple crimes relating to his repeated assaults against his wife, including domestic violence in the presence of a child. Diviney’s wife testified at trial that on the night in question she had put her child to bed, leaving the door cracked open. Diviney then returned home as the child was still asleep and began assaulting his wife in the other room.
At trial, Diviney moved for a directed verdict on the count of domestic violence in the presence of a child, arguing that the statuary elements for the charge had not been met. Diviney claimed that the child must be “a perceiving witness of the domestic violence in some way, shape, or form” – which would not be possible while the child was asleep (State v. Diviney, 2021). The trial court denied Diviney’s motion, noting that it is only necessary that a child may hear or may see an act of domestic violence to support this charge. Diviney appealed his subsequent conviction.
Relevant Issue
What standard of review governs a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict?
Rule
A trial court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed for correctness.
Analysis
The Court noted that their review of the denial of a motion for directed verdict is highly deferential to the trial court’s decision. Particularly when the denial is based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the court will “uphold the [trial] court’s denial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt” (State v. Barner, 2020).
Looking to the Diviney’s claim regarding the domestic violence in the presence of a child statute, the court noted that they would first look to “the plain language of the statute” (State v Rincon, 2012). The relevant statute states: “In the presence of a child” means: (i) in the physical presence of a child; or (ii) having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of domestic violence” (Utah Code § 76-5-109.1(1)(c). The statutory language may allows for the possibility that something can occur. The Court reasoned that even though Diviney believed the child to be asleep in the other room, it would be entirely possible that the child could have woken up and heard or seen the assault.
Holding
Given this possibility, in the light most favorable to the State, evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could find that Diviney actions met the elements for domestic violence in the presence of a child. The Court affirmed Diviney’s conviction.