Facts
Scott Nicholas Lucke was convicted of felony stalking after texting his ex-wife, who had a civil stalking injunction against him. Despite being warned not to contact her, Lucke sent her a message referencing their child, which led to criminal charges.
At multiple points before trial, the court urged Lucke to accept appointed counsel. He declined each time, expressing distrust of the legal system and skepticism of attorneys. The court ultimately allowed him to proceed pro se, with standby counsel appointed only shortly before trial. Lucke represented himself during the trial and was convicted by a jury. The court sentenced him to prison and issued a permanent stalking injunction.
Issue
Did the district court violate Lucke’s constitutional rights by allowing him to represent himself without ensuring that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel?
Rule
Under both the U.S. and Utah constitutions, a defendant has the right to legal counsel and the right to waive that counsel and represent themselves. But any waiver of counsel must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Courts are expected to conduct a thorough colloquy to confirm that a defendant understands the risks of going pro se.
If this standard isn’t met, and the defendant is allowed to proceed without counsel anyway, it can amount to structural error—an error so serious it invalidates the trial without the need to show prejudice.
Application
The Utah Court of Appeals found that the district court failed on two fronts:
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Inadequate Colloquy: The court never fully engaged in a proper dialogue to determine whether Lucke understood what he was giving up. It skipped key questions—like whether his decision was voluntary or whether he grasped the potential penalties and complexities of trial. What did happen was described more as one-sided urging than true back-and-forth questioning.
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No Evidence from the Record: Looking beyond the colloquy, the court also found no indication that Lucke understood the responsibilities or legal rules he would be expected to follow. His trial conduct—admitting guilt in opening statements, using irrelevant arguments, and opting out of closing arguments—further supported that conclusion.
Because the right to counsel is fundamental, and because a valid waiver was never shown, the court ruled that this was structural error, requiring automatic reversal.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals vacated Lucke’s conviction and sent the case back for further proceedings. The opinion reinforces that judges must do more than simply ask if a defendant wants a lawyer. They have to make sure the defendant knows what that choice means—or the case risks being overturned no matter the verdict.