Smith was convicted by a jury at trial on a felony charge of rape. He raised several issues on appeal, including multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and a claim that the district court erred when denying his motion to dismiss based on destruction of evidence and failure to preserve exculpatory evidence.
This article focuses on legal issues relating to the destruction and preservation of evidence.
Initial Facts and Status – Case Declined
In 2003, thirteen-year-old Maddison (a pseudonym used here to preserve privacy) reported a sexual assault. She went to a hospital the day after the assault, and reported that Smith had raped her. Hospital staff completed a rape kit, taking swabs of materials from her cervix.
During the investigation, police interviewed Maddison, a s friend who was nearby when the rape was alleged to have occurred, and Smith — the person being accused. Smith denied all involvement in the rape, but consented to provide a DNA sample to police.
Police sent the rape kit and Smith’s DNA sample to the crime lab. After several months, the lab reported its results. Police records stated that the lab report showed “no DNA present of the suspect.”
The lab report referred specifically the testing of materials from the cervical swab. But it appears that police misunderstood the significance of the results. The crime lab’s report additionally indicated that a sperm sample was found on swab, but the sample was too small to allow them to develop a DNA profile (using the technology available at the time). The detective misunderstood the lab results, writing in police reports that Smith’s DNA sample did not match the sperm sample obtained from the swab.
State prosecutors declined to file charges, due to the mistaken interpretation of the lab results. The investigation into Smith’s involvement was essentially closed.
Subsequent Testing and Decision to File Charges
In 2018, the state crime lab sent the rape kit to a private forensic DNA testing company. Due to significant advancements in DNA profiling techniques, the company was able to create a DNA profile from the unidentified sperm sample. This profile was eventually matched to Smith’s DNA sample, and State prosecutors filed felony rape charges against Smith in 2003.
Jury Trial and Verdict
During pretrial proceedings, it became apparent that much of the 2003 evidence was no longer available. The audio recordings of interviews with Maddison, Maddison’s friend, and Smith had been destroyed, as well as a letter from the prosecutor declining to prosecute the case. Smith filed a motion to dismiss the case over the destroyed evidence, which the district court judge denied. Smith was convicted by a jury at trial and then appealed his conviction.
Issue on Appeal
Did the district court err by denying Smith’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violated his due process rights? Was there a reasonable probability that destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory to Smith?
Legal Analysis
The Utah case of State v. Tiedemann contains the relevant precedent establishing the required analysis when evidence is destroyed. In Tiedemann the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when “a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory” the court looks to 1) the reason the evidence was destroyed, and 2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant considering the context of the case as a whole. In State v. DeJesus the Court clarified that there must be a reasonable probability that evidence would be exculpatory before a court considers the two Tiedemann factors.
Smith claimed on appeal that the destroyed interviews of Maddison and Maddison’s friend would likely have contained inconsistencies regarding their accounts of the rape. Smith did not, however, explain what specific parts or details of these interviews would have been contradictory. The Utah Supreme Court previously explained that “speculation that destroyed video evidence could have impeached testimony in some unspecified was insufficient to satisfy the reasonable probability threshold.”
Smith claimed further that because only some, but not all, of the 2003 evidence was destroyed there was a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory. In Smith’s case the 2003 audio interviews had been destroyed, but the DNA evidence and detective’s written report were preserved. Again, Smith does not provide any reason to support this claim that the destruction of evidence was done in bad faith. The police agency investigating the case stated they had a retention policy of five years for evidence in cases not currently being prosecuted. The destruction of evidence is equally, if not more, likely to have been done pursuant to this retention policy, when Smith provides no support for the argument that the evidence was destroyed in bad faith.
Conclusion by the Utah Court of Appeals
Smith’s claims do not establish that a reasonable probability existed that the destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory. Because this threshold was not reached, the court is not required to engage in the Tiedemann factors. Because the Court of Appeals did not find any of Smith’s remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be compelling, the Court affirmed Smith’s conviction.