At trial Taylor was convicted by a jury of one count of sodomy on a child. Taylor later appealed that conviction on grounds that the district court judge abused their discretion by failing to strike two potential jurors from the jury pool.
Facts of the Case
During jury selection, two notable exchanges emerged between the prosecutor, defense counsel, and two potential jurors. Juror 14 was a police officer, who revealed that in their professional experience they had handled about twenty sexual abuse cases. The prosecutor asked Juror 14 if, given his background, he could be fair and impartial to the present defendant, and Juror 14 responded that he could. Defense counsel then asked Juror 14 if he had ever arrested anyone who they felt were factually innocent. Juror 14 responded that he had not, and that he would believe the same of another police officer. At this point, defense counsel moved to strike Juror 14 for cause, arguing that Juror 14 already believed the defendant to be guilty simply because he had been arrested. The district court judge allowed Juror 14 to remain in the jury pool, claiming his earlier response expressed he would be fair and impartial to the present defendant.
While being questioned, Juror 26 indicated they had a bias in favor of police officers and would give greater weight to an officer’s testimony. Juror 26 agreed that they would be fair in assessing any evidence in the case and would try to allow other testimony to reach the level of a police officer’s. Defense counsel also moved to strike Juror 26 for cause, arguing she still held bias in favor of law enforcement testimony. The district court judge denied the motion to strike, claiming Juror 26 had indicated they would follow court directions to be fair and impartial.
Issues on Appeal
Taylor challenged the district court’s refusal to strike Juror 14 and 26 for cause. The Court of Appeals noted that deference is traditionally granted to trial judges because they are “advantaged in determining which persons would be fair and impartial juror.” The Court also noted, however, that excusing a potential juror is a simple solution when there is concern of improper bias.
Analysis
The Utah Supreme Court previously ruled in West v. Holley concerning voir dire responses that reveal bias or partiality. Evidence of juror bias leads to a presumption of bias and the potential juror must be dismissed, unless that presumption is rebutted. A juror may show that the potential bias is not serious and would not close their mind to opposing testimony. A presumption of bias, however, is not rebutted “solely by a juror’s bare assurance of their own impartiality.” If the presumption of bias is not rebutted the trial court abuses their discretion by allowing the challenged juror to remain in the jury pool.
While Juror 14 stated that they would be fair and impartial to the present defendant, their responses to other questions indicated bias. Juror 14 asserted that in his professional experience in law enforcement, he had never arrested someone who was factually innocent. Juror 14 also stated that they would believe the same of other police officers. Juror 14’s further responses did not work to overcome this presumption of bias towards the guilt of defendant’s via their arrest.
Juror 26 overtly stated that she had a bias in favor of law enforcement, and would give greater weight to a police officer’s testimony. No statements were made to mitigate this presumption of bias, other than that the juror would allow other evidence to try to reach the level of police testimony.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals found that a presumption of bias emerged for Jurors 14 and 26, that was never overcome through further mitigating statements. The trial court judge would have been required to dismiss juror under these circumstances and abused their discretion by not doing so. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for a new trial.