This appeal involves a question of whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated after the State did not prosecute the case for over two years after filing charges.
Facts of the Case
In 2011, Hintze was convicted of attempted unlawful sexual activity with a minor. Hintze was required to register as a sex offender which prohibited him from being in public parks. In 2016 police officers found and identified Hintze in a public park, however he was not arrested and charges were not immediately filed.
In 2017, Hintze was convicted of attempted forcible sexual abuse for a separate and unrelated incident. Hintze received a sentence of zero-to-five years in prison for this conviction.
In 2018, the State finally filed a case against Hintze for the 2016 park incident. The State, however, did not notify Hintze of the new charge, nor did the State take any action to advance the case until 2020. When Hintze learned of the new case he requested that the court schedule a hearing and appoint an attorney.
Also in 2020, Hintze attended a parole hearing for the 2017 conviction that he was currently incarcerated for. The Board of Pardons and Parole denied Hintze’s request for parole, citing the new unresolved charge from the 2016 park incident.
When Hintze finally attended court for the new charge he filed a motion to dismiss the case, claiming his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court denied the motion, and Hintze appealed that decision.
Issue
Was Hintze’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial violated when the State did not prosecute the case for over two years after filing charges? Specifically, under the four-part test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), what was the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, did Hintze assert his right to a speedy trial, and was Hintze prejudiced by the delay?
Analysis
None of the Barker factors are individually necessary or sufficient to conclude that one’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. A court will consider how the factors are related, as well as other relevant circumstances.
The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, considers whether the delay is “uncommonly long” and justifies a full Barker analysis. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992). Generally courts have considered delays longer than one year from the time the case is filed to the time the case is tried to be uncommonly long. In Hintze’s case, charges were filed in 2018, however the State took no action to prosecute the case until 2020. This two year delay justifies further inquiry into the remaining Barker factors.
The second Barker factor looks to the reason for the delay, particularly “whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay” See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. In Hintze’s case it appears the State is entirely to blame for the delay, given that Hintze was not even aware the case existed during the two years after charges were filed. This Barker factor also looks to whether the reason for the delay was deliberate, neutral, or valid. Here, the State appears to have simply forgotten about, or failed to prioritize this case, making the reason for the delay neutral.
The third Barker factor examines whether the defendant in some way asserted their right to a speedy trial. While Hintze did not formally file a motion invoking this right until late 2020, he did take action immediately after learning of the case’s existence. Hintze first learned of the new charges when his request for parole was denied in early 2020. Hintze then promptly wrote to the court and requested that a hearing be scheduled and that an attorney be appointed to represent him. This action would indicate that Hintze was trying to get his case moving forward, after the State and court had failed to schedule hearings on the case.
The final Barker factor considers the extent that the defendant was prejudiced by the State’s delay. Courts have found instances of prejudice even when the defendant is incarcerated on other charges, as was the case for Hintze. An already-incarcerated defendant may still be harmed by a speedy-trial delay, including through adverse parole decisions, not being able to participate in prison programs, or being ineligible for concurrent sentencing.
Hintze claimed on appeal that he was prejudiced by the State’s delay by being deprived of the opportunity for parole in early 2020. Beginning in 2018, Hintze was sentenced to zero-to-five years in prison for the 2017 case. Hintze had an initial parole hearing in 2018, where he was told to complete sex-offender treatment before his next hearing before the Board of Pardons and Parole. By 2020, Hintze had successfully completed the treatment and served more than half of his maximum sentence, but was again denied parole due to the new unresolved case.
Had the State immediately prosecuted the case in 2018 after filing the charges for the park incident, there would likely have been a different outcome at Hintze’s 2020 parole hearing. If prosecution had begun in 2018, the case would almost certainly have been resolved prior to 2020. Even if Hintze had been convicted for the park incident, he would likely have received a concurrent sentence to the prison sentence he was already serving for his 2017 conviction. With the park incident resolved, Hintze likely would have been a good candidate for parole in 2020. Hintze had completed all required treatment and served more than half of his maximum five-year sentence. Hintze therefore likely spent more time in prison due to the State’s delay.
Conclusion
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that all four of the Barker factors weighed in Hintze’s favor. Because of these factors, and all relevant circumstances, Hintze’s right to a speedy trial was violated by the State’s failure to prosecute his case for two years. The Court reversed the district court’s denial of Hintze’s motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal.